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Brief for the Committee of Law Teachers Against
Segregation in Legal Education*
By THOMAS I. EMERSON, JOHN P. FRANK, ALEXANDER H. FREY,
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, ROBERT HALE, HAROLD HAVIGHURST,
and EDWARD LEvI**
Foreword
The editors of Minnesota Law Review greatly value the op-
portunity to make this significant brief readily available to the
profession. It is the brief of Amici Curiae filed on behalf of the
Committee of Law Teachers in the United States Supreme Court in
Sweatt v. Painter et al., No. 44, October Term, 1949. It was filed
in support of Herman M. Sweatt, a negro seeking admittance to
the University of Texas School of Law. The case is scheduled for
argument in the Supreme Court this month, March, 1950. How-
ever the case may be decided, the considerations urged in this brief
are of permanent value, transcending in importance the merits of
any single controversy. As will be seen, the brief deals with the
problem of segregation in its broader aspects, as well as in its par-
ticular application to legal education. For this reason it gives the
editors deep satisfaction to make this brief available for easy refer-
ence in any law library.
Only the formal portions of the brief and references to the
record are omitted.
*See Appendix A. infra p. 328.
**Thomas I. Emerson, Professor of Law, Yale Law School; John P.
Frank, Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Alexander H. Frey,
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erwin N.
Griswold, Dean and Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Robert Hale,
Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School; Harold Havighurst,
Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Ed-
ward Levi, Professor of Law, University of Chicago School of Law.
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STATEMENT
The essential facts are as follows:
The courts below have denied petitioner's application for a
writ of mandamus to compel the appropriate officials of the Uni-
versity of Texas to admit him to its law school in Austin, Texas.
He is concededly in all respects qualified for admission to that
school except for the disqualification of race, for Texas bars
Negroes from this University. The courts below have rejected
petitioner's contention that this exclusion and petitioner's con-
sequent relegation to a state "colored law school" violate his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the time the record below was made, the colored school was
located in Austin, Texas. It has since been moved to Houston.
Petitioner contends that, for the decision of the issues on which
he petitions, the location is immaterial except in one important
respect: The use of the University of Texas (white) faculty
members was contemplated while the school was in Austin, but
a separate faculty is to be recruited for Houston.
The Texas law school (colored) was set up in response to the
order of the district court at an earlier stage of this same litiga-
tion, and it does not appear in the record that there have ever
actually been any students in it (though doubtless there are some),
either in Austin or in Houston. Sweatt was the first Negro to
apply for admission to the Texas law school (white), and in any
case Texas concedes that the colored school will have very few
students.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The basic position of this brief is that segregated legal educa-
tion in the state institutions of Texas violates the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That position is approached
by three different paths.
First, analysis of the origins of "equal protection" in American
law shows that, in the form of "equality before the law," it was
transferred to this country from the French by Charles Sumner as
part of his attack on segregated education in Massachusetts a
decade before the Civil War, and linked by him with the Declara-
tion of Independence. Popularized by Sumner, it or like phrases
became the slogan of the abolitionists, and it passed into the Con-
stitution as an important part of the abolitionists' share of the
Civil War victory. Congress, contemporaneously with the adoption
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, clearly understood that segregation
was incompatible with equality, a judgment reflected by this Court
in Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445 (1873).
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), this Court aban-
doned the original conception of equal protection, adopting instead
the legal fiction that segregation (in that case, in transportation)
is not discriminatory. This was a product, in part at least, of a
policy judgment that the judiciary was incapable of enforcing the
Amendment as it was written, and that the underlying social evil
must be left to the correction of time. The Court erred on both
counts: the judiciary is not so powerless as it supposed, and the
results of its abdication have been disastrous. The dissenting views
of Mr. Justice Harlan in the Plessy case were correct, and should
be adopted now.
Second, we challenge the applicability to education of the
"separate but equal" refinement of the equal protection clause.
While we grant the existence of troublesome dicta, there is neither
a holding nor even carefully considered dicta by this Court declar-
ing that segregation may be enforced in any phase of education.
In Plessy v. Ferguson the Court did not say that segregation was
valid in every context in which men could devise ways of separat-
ing themselves by color. On the contrary, it made careful distinc-
tion between reasonable and unreasonable segregation. We con-
tend that segregation in education is for this purpose unreasonable.
Third, even within the broadest application of Plessy v. Fer-
guson, petitioner is entitled to absolute equality in education. For
reasons set forth in detail in the body of the brief, it is impossible
for petitioner to receive at the improvised colored law school a
legal education equal to that offered at the well-known Univer-
sity of Texas law school (white). Nor, indeed, can segregated
legal education ever afford equal facilities.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE WAS INTENDED TO
OUTLAW SEGREGATION.
The Court below held (a) that segregated legal education can
meet the constitutional standard, and (b) that Texas (colored)
in fact did so. We challenge at the outset the entire basis of any
decision which assumes that segregation can meet the standard
of the Constitution. The Negro for whom the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment was primarily adopted was largely read
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out of that Amendment by nineteenth century decisions.1 The
time has come to reconsider the frustration of so much of section
one of the Amendment as relates to the equal protection of the laws.
Society in the past has known intermediate stages of bondage
between the free and the slave. In antiquity, "between men of
these extremes of status stood social classes which lived outside
the boundary of slavery but not yet within the circle of those who
might rightly be called free."' 2 The Thirteenth Amendment took
the Negroes out of the class of slaves. Section one of the Four-
teenth Amendment was intended to insure that they not be dropped
at some half-way house on the road to freedom. It sought to bring
the ex-slaves within the circle of the truly free by obliterating legal
distinctions based on race.
The evidence of intent to eliminate race distinctions in trans-
portation and education, relationships which must be considered
together in the history of equal protection, is particularly clear.
Equal protection first entered American law in a controversy over
segregated education.
1. The original meaning of equal protection is incompatible
with segregated education.
It was one thing, and a very important one, to declare as a
political abstraction that "all men are created equal," and quite
another to attach concrete rights to this state of equality. The
Declaration of Independence did the former. The latter was Charles
Sumner's outstanding contribution to American law.
The great- abstraction of the Declaration of Independence was
the central rallying point for the anti-slavery movement. When
slavery was the evil to be attacked, no more was needed. But as
some of the New England States became progressively more com-
mitted to abolition, the focus of interest shifted from slavery itself
to the status and rights of the free Negro. In the Massachusetts
legislature in the 1840's, Henry Wilson, wealthy manufacturer,
abolitionist, and later United States Senator and Vice President,
led the fight against discrimination, with "equality" as his rallying
1. While decisions outside the area of segregation are not directly in-
volved in this case, the leading segregation decision of Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U. S. 537 (1896), can be understood only as part of a group of decisions
in the latter part of the nineteenth century narrowly construing the capacity
of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect Negro rights. Other decisions in-
clude the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 542 (1883), and United States v.
Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (1883).




cry.3 One Wilson measure gave the right to recover damages to
any person "unlawfully excluded" from the Massachusetts public
schools.4
Boston thereupon established a segregated school for Negro
children the legality of which was challenged in Roberts v. City
of Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 198 (1849). Counsel for Roberts was
Charles Sumner, scholar and lawyer, whose resultant oral argu-
ment was widely distributed among abolitionists as a pamphlet.5
Sumner contended that separate schools violated the Massachusetts
state constitutional provision that "All men are created free and
equal."" He conceded that this phrase, like its counterpart in the
Declaration of Independence, did not by itself amount to a legal
formula which could decide concrete cases. Nonetheless it was a
time-honored phrase for a time-honored idea and, in a broad
historical argument, he traced the theory of equality from Herodo-
tus, Seneca and Milton to Diderot and Rousseau, philosophers of
eighteenth century France.
At this point Sumner made his major contribution to the theory
of equality. He noted that the French Revolutionary Constitution
of 1791 had passed beyond Diderot and Rousseau to a new phrase:
"Men are born and continue free and equal in their rights." Using
a popular French phrase in English for the first time, Sumner re-
ferred to "egalit6 devant la loi," or equality before the law. The
conception of equality before the law, or equality "in their rights,"
was a vast step forward, for this was the first occasion on which
equality of rights had been made a legal consequence of "created
equal."
Equality before the law, or equality of rights, Sumner insisted,
was the basic meaning of the Massachusetts constitutional pro-
vision. Before it "all . . . distinctions disappear." Man, equal
before the law, "is not poor, weak, humble, or black; nor is he
Caucasian, Jew, Indian, or Ethiopian; nor is he French, German,
English, or Irish; he is a MAN, the equal of all his fellow men."'7
Separate schools were unconstitutional because they made a dis-
3. For an account of Wilson's struggles against anti-miscegenation
laws, against separate transportation for Negroes, and for Negro education,
see Nason, Life of Henry Wilson, 48 et seq. (1876).
4. Mass. Acts 1845, c. 214.
5. Among those active in distributing the pamphlet was Salmon P.
Chase of Ohio. Diary and Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase, Chase to
Sumner, Dec. 14, 1849, in 2 Ann. Rep. Am. Hist. Ass'n 188 (1902).
6. The following summary of argument is taken from the complete
argument reprinted in 2 Sumner, Works 327 et seq. (1874).
7. Ibid.
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tinction where there could be no distinction, at the point of race,
and therefore separate schools violated the principle of equality
before the law.
The Massachusetts court, unpersuaded, rejected Sumner's argu-
ment, and was in turn reversed by the state legislature.' But the
argument outlasted the case, and from it the phrase "equality
before the law," or its briefer counterpart, "equal rights," became
the measuring stick for all proposals concerning freedmen.
Prior to the Civil War, the controversy over equality for the
freedmen was primarily a dispute within the States, but national
emancipation brought the issue to Congress where Sumner kept
"equality" in the forefront of Congressional attention.' Shortly
before the first meeting of the 39th Congress in December, 1865,
the new Black Codes in the Southern States had shocked the
North into widespread recognition of the need to secure equality.10
Sumner's popularization of his equality theory had been so suc-
cessful that its echo returned from Radicals everywhere." Rep-
resentative Bingham of Ohio offered a proposed Fourteenth
Amendment in which the key phrase was a guarantee to the people
of "equal protection in their rights, life, liberty, and property."' "2
Senator Morrill of Vermont, shortly to be a member of the joint
Committee on Reconstruction, sent a note to Sumner suggesting
that the best "jural phrase" for an amendment would be a guar-
antee that citizens are "equal in their civil rights, immunities and
privileges and equally entitled to protection in life, liberty and
property."" Sumner himself introduced a reconstruction plan, an
8. Mass Acts 1855, c. 256.
9. See, e.g., his discussion in the Senate of the possible wisdom of
including "equality" in the Thirteenth Amendment. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1482 (1864).
10. Handy compilations of these Codes are McPherson, Handbook of
Politics for 1868, 29-44 (1868); 1 Fleming, Documentary History of Re-
construction c. 4 (1906).
11. "Equality before the law" was the general cry. A Pennsylvania
State Equal Rights League signed its correspondence "Yours for justice
and equality before the law.' Letter to Stevens of Nov. 1, 1865. Stevens
Mss. (1865), Lib. Cong. And see resolution of Providence, R. I., Union
League Club, ibid, asking "our members in Congress" to secure "equal
rights of all men before the law." "Absolute equality before the law" was
demanded in Grosvenor, 24 New Englander 268 (1865). See also Tames,
The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment 29 et seq. (1939), an unpub-
lished Ph.D. thesis in the library of the University of Illinois. On the rela-
tive amount of attention given the first, as compared to the other sections
of the Amendment, see note 22 infra,
12. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865).
13. Morrill to Sumner, undated, prob. Oct. or Nov., 1865, in Sumner
Mss., quoted in James, supra note 11 at 31.
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important part of which included "equal protection and equal
rights." 1 .
The first relevant measure actually to be considered by Con-
gress was the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
This bill was originally introduced by Senator Wilson of Massa-
chusetts, the same Wilson who had been so active earlier in the
equality struggles in that state,1" and we may assume that the
proposal represented the joint policies of Wilson and Sumner.-6
The Wilson proposal invalidated all laws "whereby or wherein
any inequality of civil rights and immunities" existed because of
"distinctions or differences of color, race or descent." This meas-
ure, as it passed the Senate, contained a clause forbidding any
"distinction of color or race" in the enforcement of certain laws,
and assured "full and equal benefit of all laws" relating to person
and property. Senator Howard, a member of the Joint Com-
mittee on Reconstruction, said of the Act, "In respect to all civil
rights, there is to be hereafter no distinction between the white
race and the black race."'1
The Civil Rights bill was enacted, but over the protest of one
extreme radical in the House. Representative Bingham of Ohio
opposed the measure on the ground that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment gave it an inadequate base. He preferred to wait until
a new Amendment might pass which would eliminate all "dis-
crimination between citizens on account of race or color."' 8 As a
member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Bingham was
then working on just such an Amendment. With fellow Commit-
tee members such as those extreme equalitarians Stevens, Howard,
and Morrill, there was no serious obstacle in Committee.
Bingham drafted for the Committee the essential language of
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the vital equality
clause he combined the language of his own earlier proposed
14. 10 Sumner, Works 22 (1874).
15. Though the measure was introduced by Wilson, actual leadership
on the proposal passed from him to Senator Trumbull of Illinois, chairman
of the Judiciary Committee. The proposal originated with S.9 in the 39th
Cong., introduced by Wilson, from which the text quotations are taken. A
few days later, after floor discussion which revealed that Trumbull was
willing to take the lead on the measure, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43
(1865), Wilson introduced a new bill, S. 55, which retained and enlarged
the language of S. 9. This bill was referred to by Trumbull's name but re-
tained Wilson's proposals. S. 61 became the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 14
Stat. 27 (1866).
16. Wilson hinted as much. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39
(1865).
17. Id. at 504.
18. Id. at 1290, 1293.
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amendment, "equal protection in their rights" and the Civil Rights
bill language, "equal benefit of all laws" into the concise "equal
protection of the laws."'" The prompt adoption of the Amend-
ment carried the abolitionist theory of racial equality into our
basic document.2 0 As Senator Howard, floor leader for the Amend-
ment in the Senate, said of the clause, it "abolishes all class legis-
lation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting
one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another." The
core of the clause he reduced to Sumner's meaning: "It estab-
lishes equality before the law .... "21
Because the primary concern of those who enacted the Four-
teenth Amendment was with sections two and three of the Amend-
ment, rather than section one which includes equal protection,
we do not have complete evidence of the views of all the respon-
sible men of the time on the meaning of equal protection.2 2 We
do know that the clause found its way into the Constitution through
Sumner, through Wilson, through Trumbull and through the
twelve majority members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
19. The greatest contribution of the Bingham draft of the clause was
not in the words he used, but in those he omitted. Previous proposals had
sometimes carried words of qualification as to the particular types of laws
as to which equal protection was to be afforded. The Civil Rights bill in
the Senate had referred to "equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and estate," and had referred to "discrimination in
civil rights and immunities." Bingham saw hopeless confusion in these re-
finements, see remarks cited, supra note 18, and omitted them. He thus
brought the language squarely into accord with the broad "equality before
the law."
20. We do not, in tracing this history of the phrase "equal protection,"
overlook sporadic earlier uses of similar language. See, e.g., Mass. Const.
Art. III (1780) ; N. H. Const. Art. VI (1792) ; and Me. Const. Art. I, § 3(1819). The context of those Articles, dealing with freedom of religion, are
so alien to the subject at hand that they were never referred to in connec-
tion with the Fourteenth Amendment.
21. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). Some of the
broad expressions contemporaneously used, as in the text above, must be
read in the light of the fact that it was racial distinctions which were being
discussed. Howard, for example, meant not that the Amendment obliterated
all classifications in the law, but that it obliterated race as a basis of
classification.
22. Much of the murkiness in the history of "privileges and immuni-
ties," "person," and "due process," as well as equal protection, is produced
by the fact that what has become the only significant part of the Amendment
was then the least significant part. The Republican Party represented a
coalescence of certain economic and political interests, along with the
abolitionists. Standard references on the subject are 2 Beard, The Rise of
American Civzlization c. 23 (1935), and 2 'Morrison and Commager, The
Growth of the American Republic c. 1 (1942). The best telling of the man-
ner in which these factions sought to solve their problems by the Four-
teenth Amendment is Flack, The Fourteenth Amendment (1908). The short
of it is that the politicians and the economic interests they represented got
the middle sections of the Amendment, while section one was the abolitionists'
share of the victory.
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tion. Of those fifteen at least eight-Sumner, Wilson, Bingham,
Howard, Stevens, Conkling, Boutwell, and Morrill-thought the
clause precluded any distinctions based on color.2 3 Three-Trum-
bull, Fessenden, and Grimes-had some mental reservations, par-
ticularly as to miscegenation, although they agreed generally with
the others.2 4 The positions of the remainder we do not know,
though some, at least, doubtless agreed with Sumner.2- It was
thus the dominant opinion of the Committee that the clause elimi-
nated distinctions of color in civil rights.
2. Contemporary rejection of "separate but equal" in Con-
gress, immediately before and after the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, represents a judgment incompatible with segregated
education.
Congress repeatedly considered "separate but equal" in the Re-
construction decade, particularly in connection with transporta-
tion. Railroad and street car companies in the District of Colum-
bia early began to separate white and colored passengers, putting
them in separate cars or in separate parts of the same car, with
quick Congressional response. As early as 1863, Congress amend-
ed the charter of the Alexandria and Washington Railroad to
provide that "No person shall be excluded from the cars on ac-
count of color."20 When, in 1864, the Washington and George-
town street car company attempted to handle its colored passen-
gers by putting them in separate cars, Sumner denounced the
23. The views of Sumner, Wilson, and Howard are apparent from
various quotations throughout this brief. Stevens was, if anything, a more
extreme equalitarian than the other two. See Miller, Tzaddeus Stevens 9-13,
404, 405 (1939) ; and see Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063, 1064 (1866).
The views of Conkling, Morrill, and Boutwell are apparent from their con-
sistent support of the Sumner civil rights bill, discussed in detail, infra.
The case as to Bingham is less clear, since his pre-occupation in the Amend-
ment was largely with the privileges and immunities clause, his special
contribution. Cf. 2 Boutwell, Reminiscences of Sixty Years 41 (1902).
However, his view was apparently in accord with the others of this group,
as evidenced at least by some phrases. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1293 (1866).
24. Fessenden and Trumbull believed that the Civil Rights Act and
the Amendment did not affect anti-miscegenation legislation. Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (Fessenden) ; id. at 322 (Trumbull). In
1864 Grimes thought segregated transportation was equal. Cong. Globe,
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3133 (1864), with Trumbull apparently contra on that
issue, id. at 3132. Whether the views of Grimes changed is not known.
25. These four members, Harris, Williams, Blow, and Washburne, were
conventional radicals and Harris, Blow, and Washburne had very strong
anti-slavery backgrounds. It is therefore highly probable that at least
some of them shared the views of Sumner and Stevens, but we have no
direct evidence.
26. 12 Stat. 805 (1863).
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practice in the Senate and set forth on a crusade to eliminate
street car segregation in the District.27 After a series of skirmishes,
he finally carried to passage a law applicable to all District car-
riers that "no person shall be excluded from any car on account
of color."
28
The discussion of the street car bills, all shortly prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment, canvassed the whole issue of segregation
in transportation. Those who supported the measures did so on
grounds of equality. Senator Wilson denounced the "Jim Crow
car," declaring it to be "in defiance of decency. '29 Sumner per-
suaded his brethren to accept the Massachusetts view, saying that
there "the rights of every colored person are placed on an equality
with those of white persons. They have the same right with white
persons to ride in every public conveyance in the common-
wealth."30 Thus when Congress in 1866 wrote equality into the
Constitution, it did so against a background of repeated judgment
that separate transportation was unequal.3'
The history of equal protection and separate schools, though
less clear, suggests a similar interpretation. The close of the War
found public education almost non-existent in the South,3 2 and
Negro school status in the North ranged from total exclusion from
schools to complete and unsegregated equality.33 Four Southern
Reconstruction constitutions provided for mixed schools, and the
Northern educational aid societies offered unsegregated education
in the South.3 4 Although these efforts to achieve unsegregated
education were of little practical effect, they indicate the intel-
lectual atmosphere from which equal protection emerged. The
abolitionists were absolutely confident that the races both could
27. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 553, 817 (1864).
28. 13 Stat. 537 (1865).
29. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3132, 3133 (1864).
30. Id. at 1158.
31. This was clear even from the conservative viewpoint. See remarks of
Senator Reverdy Johnson, id. at 1156.
32. One of the many works on the subject is Knight, The Influence of
Reconstruction on Education in the South (1913).
33. An extensive account contemporary with Reconstruction, much
broader in scope than the title indicates, is Spec. Rep., Commissioner of
Education on Condition and Improvement of Public Schools, Dist. Col.,
H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1870).
34. Materials are collected in 2 Fleming, supra note 10 at 171-212. Even
conservative Southerners, when they sought to give full compliance to the
Fourteenth Amendment, conceded that equality required unsegregated edu-
cation. See Williams, The Louisiana Unification Movement in 1873, 2 J.
South. Hist. 349 (1945), describing the concession of mixed schools by a
political group headed by Gen. P. T. Beauregard.
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and should, under the principle of equality, mingle in the school
rooms.
35
The primary responsibility of Congress for education was in
the District of Columbia, where a segregated system was a going
operation prior to the end of the Civil War. Securing a place
on the District of Columbia Committee, Sumner proceeded to
attack discriminations in the District one at a time.36 Since he
chose first to eliminate restrictions on Negro office-holding and
jury service, he did not reach the school question on his own
agenda until 1870.37 He then twice carried proposals through the
Committee to eliminate the segregation,38 and urged his proposal
on the floor of the Senate on the grounds of equality: "Every
child, white or black, has a right to be placed under precisely
the same influences, with the same teachers, in the same school
room, without any discrimination founded on color."' 9
The most important new voice heard in the District of Colum-
bia school debate on Sumner's proposal was that of Senator Matt
Carpenter of Wisconsin, a leading constitutional lawyer of his
time and prevailing counsel in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333
(1867), Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869), and the
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873). Carpenter said:
"Mr. President, we have said by our constitution, we
have said by our statutes, we have said by our party plat-
forms, we have said through the political press, we have
said from every stump in the land, that from this time hence-
35. The Amendment must be read in the light of this psychology of
optimism. Immediately after the War the abolitionist societies undertook
educational work in the South on a large scale, fully recorded in such of
their journals as The American Freeman and the Freeman's Journa. The
Constitution of the Freeman's and Union Commission provided that "No
schools or supply depots shall be maintained from the benefits of which any
person shall be excluded because of color." The Am. Freeman 18 (1866).
Lyman Abbott, General Secretary of the Commission, published a statement
explaining that the policy had been fully considered: "It is inherently right.
To exclude a child from a free school, because he is either white or black,
is inherently wrong .... [We must] lead public sentiment toward its final
goal, equal justice and equal rights .... The adoption of the reverse prin-
ciple would really lend our influence against the progress of liberty, equality,
and fraternity, henceforth to be the motto of the republic." Id. at 6. The
fact is that few whites attended these schools. Boyd, Some Phases of Edit-
cational History it; the South since 1865, Studies in Southern History 259
(1914).
36. Sumner expounded this seriatim policy in Cong. Globe, 40th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 39 (1867).
37. The jury and office law was twice pocket-vetoed by President
Johnson, and Sumner, therefore, had to secure its passage three times before
it became effective in President Grant's administration. 16 Stat. 3 (1869).
38. S. 361, Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 3273 (1870), and S. 1244,
id. at 1053 et seq.
39. Id. at 1055.
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forth forever, where the American flag floats, there shall be
no distinction of race or color or on account of previous
condition of servitude, but that all men, without regard to
these distinctions, shall be equal, undistinguished before the
law. Now, Mr. President, that principle covers this whole
case."
40
Filibuster, not votes, stalled the District of Columbia school
measure. 41 Sumner thereupon terminated his efforts to clear up
discriminations one at a time and determined to make one supreme
effort along the entire civil rights front. He put his whole energy
behind a general Civil Rights bill, which forbade segregation
throughout the Union, in the District of Columbia and outside
it, in conveyances, theaters, inns, and schools.4 2 The consideration
by the Senate of this measure, which in modified form became
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, represents an overwhelming con-
temporary judgment that "separate but equal" schools, wherever
located, violate the equal protection clause.
In the debates on this new civil rights bill, the leading cases
on which this Court relied in Plessy v. Ferguson were pressed
upon the Senate and rejected as unsound. Roberts v. City of
Boston, supra, was quoted without avail. 43 A ocntemporary Ohio
decision, State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1872), which held
that separate schools were adequate, was rejected by name before
these men who knew the Fourteenth Amendment best.4 4 They
made the point over and over again that the Amendment forbade
distinctions because of race. As Senator Edmunds of Vermont,
later chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, put it when
he rejected separate schools: "This is a matter of inherent right,
unless you adopt the slave doctrine that color and race are reasons
for distinction among citizens. ' 45 Sumner himself denounced
40. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1056 (1871).
41. By 1872, the filibuster had come into frequent use in the defense
against radical legislation. By a vote of 35 to 20 Sumner defeated those
who sought to keep his District school measure off the floor entirely, Cong.
Globe, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3124 (1872), but his time was used up before
he could bring the matter to final vote.
42. The measure was proposed by Sumner both as a bill and as an
amendment to other bills over a period of years. Its final presentation was in
the 43rd Cong., S. 1.
43. Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3261 (1872).
44. Senator Ferry, opposing the bill, relied on the McCann case. Id. at
3257. At the time of its final consideration, Senator Frelinghuysen, in charge
of the bill in the Senate, explained why he thought the McCann case should
not control. 2 Cong. Rec. 3452, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1874).
45. Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3260 (1872).
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"separate but equal" in the Senate as he had denounced it in his
oral argument in Roberts v. City of Boston years before:
"Then comes the other excuse, which finds Equality in
separation. Separate hotels, separate conveyances, separate
theaters, seaprate schools, separate institutions of learning
and science, separate churches, and separate cemeteries-
these are the artificial substitutes for Equality; and this is
the contrivance by which a transcendent right, involving a
transcendent duty, is evaded.
... Assuming what is most absurd to assume, and what
is contradicted by all experience, that a substitute can be
an equivalent, it is so in form only and not in reality. Every
such attempt is an indignity to the colored race, instinct
with the spirit of slavery, and this decides its character.
It is Slavery in its last appearance."46
The bill started its final road to passage in the 43rd Congress.
As Sumner had died, Senator Frelinghuysen of New Jersey led
the debate for the bill, beginning on April 29, 1874, with an ex-
tensive argument that segregation was incompatible with the Four-
teenth Amendment. The bill, he said, sought "freedom from all
discrimination before the law on account of race, as one of the
fundamental rights of United States citizenship." 47 For this he
found full warrant in the equal protection clause. Segregation
in the schools, he said, could only be voluntary, for "the object of
the bill is to destroy, not to recognize, the distinctions of race."48
There were in the Senate three distinct views on the problem
of segregated schools. A minority thought that "separate but
equal" schools should be permitted. On May 22, 1874, an amend-
ment to that effect offered by Senator Sargent of California was
rejected, 26 to 21. Those 26 included Morrill, Conkling and Bout-
well, who had been on the Committee which had drafted the
Amendment. By voting to reject the "separate but equal" school
clause, they necessarily indicated a judgment that Congress had
power to legislate against segregated schools under the equal pro-
tection clause. This contemporary affirmative and deliberate inter-
pretation of the Constitution is entitled to great weight here.
McPhcrson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27 (1892).
The 26 were not themselves of one mind. Senator Boutwell
represented a small minority view that separate schools neces-
sarily bred intolerance and therefore should not be allowed to exist
46. Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 382, 383 (1871) (emphasis
added).
47. 2 Cong. Rec. 3452, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1874).
48. Ibid.
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even if both races desired it.49 However, the dominant Senate
opinion was that separate schools should be forbidden by law, as
the Amendment and this bill forbade them; but that if the entire
population were content in particular instances to accept separate
schools, it might do so. Senator Pratt of Indiana, one of the
most vigorous supporters of the bill, noted that Congress was con-
tinuing separate schools in the District of Columbia because both
races were content with them; and at the same time he pointed
out that where there were very few colored students, they would
have to be intermingled. 50 Senator Howe put it most concretely
when he observed that if, by law, schools were permitted to be
separate, they would never in fact be equal. He .believed in pro-
hibiting separate schools and then letting people do as they chose:
"Let the individuals and not the superintendent of schools judge
of the comparative merits of the schools.", 1
The bill passed the Senate, but in the House the result was
different. The bill passed, but with the school clause deleted.
This deletion was the product of many factors. The House
had previously voted to require mixed schools, 2 but on this occa-
sion it was confronted with the firm opposition of the George
Peabody Fund. Peabody, an American merchant who founded
what became J. P. Morgan & Co., established a fund of $3,000,000
to aid education in the South. As abolitionist education aid socie-
ties ran out of money and collapsed, the Peabody Fund became
the only major outside agency aiding Southern education. The
Fund opposed mixed schools, withdrawing its aid where they
were required. 53 It claimed credit for inducing President Grant
to instruct his House floor leader to abandon the school provi-
sion.54 Coupled with this pressure were threats from Southern
representatives that they would end their newly founded public
49. "If it were possible, as in the large cities it is possible, to establish
separate schools for black children and for white children, it is in the highest
degree inexpedient to either establish or tolerate such schools." From speech
of Senator Boutwell, id. at 4116.
50. Id. at 4081, 4082.
51. Id. at 4151.
52. H.R. 1647, Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2074 (1872), (House
refused, 73 to 99, to lay bill on table); id. at 2270, 2271 (engrossed and
read three times, 100 to 78) ; no final action taken.
53. 2 Fleming, supra note 10 at 194. During this period the Fund was
under the direction of Dr. Barnas Sears, later succeeded by J. L. Curry.
Curry, in a volume on the work of the Fund, introduces the topic of mixed
schools with the words, "Some persons, not to 'the manner born,' took the
lead in organizing a crusade for the co-education of the races." Curry, Brief
Sketch of George Peabody 60 (1898).
54. Id. at 64, 65.
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school systems if the Senate measure passed. 5 In addition, some
Representatives felt that the courts would protect the Negroes on
the school issue, and thus as a matter of legislative discretion
waived the right to legislative aid.56 For whatever combination
of reasons, a leading Negro Representative from South Carolina
consented to eliminate the school clause in return for assurance
that the rest of the bill would pass.57 The House result, clearly,
thus represented a political rather than a constitutional judgment.
In summary, equal protection as a legal conception originated
before the Civil War in Sumner's attack on segregated schools.
It became the abolitionist rallying cry and was brought into the
Constitution by the abolitionist wing of the Republican Party.
Before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, "equal rights"
was thoroughly understood to mean identical, and not separate
rights, particularly in transportation. That was the view of the
dominant group among those who actually phrased the Fourteenth
Amendment. Throughout the debate on the Amendment its sup-
porters acknowledged no doctrine of equal but separate as an
exception to the fundamental concept of equal rights. Contem-
porary legislative action confirms this basic position.
3. In Railroad Co. v. Brown, this Court early decided that
"separate" could not be "equal".
In the leading case of Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445
(1873), this Court early decided that separate accommodations,
no matter how identical they might otherwise be, were not equal.
On February 8, 1868, Catherine Brown, colored, attempted to
board a railroad car on a line from Alexandria to Washington.
That road had a "Sumner amendment" in its charter which pro-
vided that "no person shall be excluded from the cars on account
of color."-s The railroad maintained two identical cars, one next
to the other on the train, using one for white and the other for
colored passengers. When Mrs. Brown attempted to sit in the
"white" car, she was ejected with great violence.
The pertinent legal issue in Mrs. Brown's case was whether
segregation amounted to the same thing as "exclusion from the
55. See, e.g., discussion of this point by Representative Roberts, who
stated that he preferred to prohibit segregated schools but would vote to
omit the clause for fear the South would abolish all school. 3 Cong. Rec.
981, 43rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1875).
56. See remarks of Representative Monroe, id. at 997, 998.
57. See remarks id. at 981, 982.
58. 12 Stat. 805 (1863).
1950]
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cars." The episode attracted immediate attention because Mrs.
Brown was in charge of the ladies' rest room at the Senate.
A Senate investigating committee concluded that the Company
had violated its charter, and recommended that the charter be
repealed if Mrs. Brown were not fully compensated by civil
damages.59
At the trial, the Company unsuccessfully asked for a charge
to the jury that separate but equal cars complied with the statute,
and in the Supreme Court it argued that "making and enforcing
the separation of races in its cars" was "reasonable and legal."'
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the "separate but
equal" argument as "an ingenious attempt to evade a compliance
with the obvious meaning of the requirement." 61 The object of
the Sumner amendment, said the Court, was not merely to let the
Negroes buy transportation, but to let them do so without "dis-
crimination":
"Congress, in the belief that this discrimination was unjust,
acted. It told the company, in substance, that it could ex-
tend its road into the District as desired, but that this dis-
crimination must cease, and the colored and white race,
in the use of the cars, be placed on an equality. This con-
dition it had the right to impose, and in the temper of
Congress at the time, it is manifest the grant could not have
been made without it. 62
Thus in its first review of "separate but equal," this Court held
that segregation was "discrimination" and not "equality." We
ask the Court to apply that same principle in the instant case.
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, which undid the Brown case and the
legislative history of equal protection, should be over-
ruled.
Twenty years after Railroad Co. v. Brown, this Court took
a wholly different view of segregation.
The exact issue in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896),
was whether a Louisiana requirement of separate railroad ac-
commodations denied equal protection. Mr. Justice Brown for
59. Sen. Rep. No. 131, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868).
60. The quotation is taken from the brief on file in the Supreme Court
library.
61. 17 Wall. 445, 452. The same approach as that of the Brown case
is taken whenever a statute which requires "equal" treatment is held to
forbid segregation. See, e.g., Baylies v. Curry, 128 Ill. 287, 21 N. E. 595(1889) (restricting Negroes to particular theater seats held violation of
statute) ; Jones v. Kehrlein, 47 Cal. App. 646, 194 P. 55 (1920) (same).
62. 17 Wall. 445 at 452, 453 (emphasis added).
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the majority held that this segregation did not stamp "the colored
race with a badge of inferiority." If it did so, said he, "it is
not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."' 6 z
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, states our case:
"It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana
does not discriminate against either race, but prescribes a
rule applicable alike to white and colored citizens. But this
argument does not meet the difficulty. Everyone knows that
the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not
so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occu-
pied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches
occupied by or assigned to white persons....
"The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in
this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the
law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling
class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal
before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most power-
full. The law regards man as man, and takes no account
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It
is, therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final
expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached
the conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate
the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon
the basis of race.
"In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in
time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by
the tribunal in the Dred Scott case." (163 U.S. at 556-9).
The core of Mr. Justice Brown's argument is in his assump-
tion that segregation is not a white judgment of colored inferior-
ity. This would be so palpably preposterous as a statement of
fact that we must assume Justice Brown intended it as a legal
fiction. The device of holding a despised people separate, whether
by confinement of the Jew to the ghetto, by exclusion of the
lowest castes in India from the temples, or by the slightly more
refined separate schoolroom, is clearly expression of a judgment
of inferiority.
The real question, therefore, is why should the Court have
63. Plessy v. Fcrgitson, 163 U. S. 537, 551 (1896).
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adopted this legal fiction? Why should the Court have thought
it necessary to make a pretense that segregation is anything other
than discrimination?
The Court chose to overthrow the Fourteenth Amendment, not
for caprice, but for reasons of policy.6 4 The specific policy judg-
ments made by the Court are analyzed in the next section of this
brief. Suffice it to point out here that Plessy v. Ferguson was
part of the process by which the Court in the latter part of the
nineteenth century failed to preserve for the Negro many of the
major gains of abolition.
We submit that the Court should return to the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. We grant, as Plessy implies, that
termination of segregation is a break with tradition. But we
contend that there is nothing in the tradition of Negro slavery
that is worth preserving. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments committed the country to the great experi-
ment of making a complete break with that tradition. When
Charles Sumner gave the abolitionists the formula of equality
before the law, he did not mean equalitr with reservations, equal-
ity with segregation. Decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson turn
the Fourteenth Amendment into a phantom or a grotesque mis-
take. As Senator Frelinghuysen said in presenting the anti-segre-
gation Civil Rights Bill of 1875 to the Senate:
"If, sir, we have not the Constitutional right thus to legis-
late, then the people of this country have perpetrated a
blunder amounting to a grim burlesque over which the world
might laugh were it not that it is a blunder over which
humanity would have occasion to mourn. Sir, we have the
right, in the language of the Constitution, to give 'to all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States the
equal protection of the laws'."65
This Court should return to the original purpose of the equal
protection clause, to forbid distinctions because of race. State-
enforced segregation is unconstitutional because it makes such a
distinction. As Senator Edmunds put it, it is "slave doctrine"
64. For discussion of the policy bases of the reconstruction decisions,
see 2 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 608 (1926).
He lists three factors: the desire to eliminate "the Negro question" from
national politics; the desire to relegate the Negroes to state authority; and
the desire to restore confidence in the Court in the South. Our central
position is that the Amendment should not have been sacrificed for any
or all of these considerations.
65. 2 Cong. Rec. 3451, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1874).
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to make color and race reasons for distinctions among citizens.
Segregation is discrimination. Railroad Co. v. Brown, supra.
II.
THE BASIC POLICIES UNDERLYING THE COURT'S AP-
PROVAL OF SEGREGATION IN PLESSY V. FERGUSON
HAVE, IN THE YEARS INTERVENING SINCE THAT DECI-
SION, PROVED TO BE NOT ONLY WHOLLY ERRONEOUS
BUT SERIOUSLY DESTRUCTIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES.
If the meaning of equal protection, whether considered in terms
of historic intent or of the ordinary meaning of words, is clearly
incompatible with segregation, as we say it is, then the further
task confronts us of assessing the underlying bases of Plessy v.
Ferguson. Concededly "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921).
This Court must deal with the same practical consideration that
faced the Court in the nineteenth century. Petitioner, if he would
persuade you to reconsider Plessy, must persuade you that Har-
lan's dissent had more than a theoretical validity.
Two fundamental judgments of fact and policy underlay'the
decision of the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson. One was the
Court's acceptance of the premise that, since "[1] egislation is pow-
erless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based
upon physical differences," it is impossible to eliminate segrega-
tion founded in the "usages, customs and traditions" of the com-
munity, and hence the Constitution must bow to the inevitable.
The other was the Court's assumption that the wiser policy was
to let events take their course and that governmental intervention
"can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situ-
ation." 163 U. S. at 550-2.
Over half a century has passed since the Court decided Plessy
v. Fcrguson. In these years much that was obscure about the
practice of segregation has become clarified. As events have un-
folded, as trends have become more distinct, as additional knowl-
edge has been gained, the impact of segregation upon American
life has emerged more clearly. In the light of these intervening
developments, the basic judgments made by the Court in Plessy
v. Ferguson have proved to be erroneous. Indeed, far from solv-
ing or even alleviating the problem of racial segregation the
decision of the Court has tended to intensify it and to create
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conditions that threaten to undermine the very structure of Ameri-
can democratic society.
1. The judgment of the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson that direct
governmental intervention to eliminate segregation is in-
effective to overcome the prevailing customs of the com-
munity has proved to be without foundation.
There are severe limitations, of course, upon the effectiveness
of direct legal compulsion to wipe out the gap that exists between
American theory and certain American practices in race relations.
But the fact is that the ideal of racial equality is a deeprooted
moral and political conviction of the American people. Decisions
of this Court upholding that conviction, therefore, cannot fail to
have a profound and far reaching effect upon the constant struggle
being waged between ideal and practice. And, conversely, a deci-
sion that fails to give support to that conviction must necessarily
have important depressing and retarding consequences.
Experience has shown that this Court is not as impotent in the
field of race relations as the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson as-
sumed. On the contrary every decision of this Court against racial
discrimination has made a significant contribution toward the
achievement of racial equality.
Concrete evidence is available, for instance, that the decisions
of this Court in the white primary cases have not only eliminated
the institution of white primaries but have resulted in a substan-
tial increase in Negro voting. V. 0. Key, in his careful study
entitled Southern Politics, reports that except in four states of
the Deep South the decision in Snith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649
(1944), was accepted "more or less as a matter of course."8 6
Pointing out that the effect of the decision was not felt until the
1946 primaries, he notes that "Florida experienced a sharp in-
crease in Negro registration after 1944"; that "[i]n 1946 the
voting status of Georgia Negroes .changed radically," the number
of Negro registrants rising to an estimated 110,000; and that in
Texas, "with a few scattered local exceptions, Negroes voted
without hindrance in the 1946 Democratic primaries." 67 Key re-
ports that four states-South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi and
Georgia-made strenuous efforts to avoid the effect of the All-
wright case, but that these .efforts were quickly nullified by the
66. Key, Southern Politics 625 (1949).
67. Id. at 625, 519-521.
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courts in both South Carolina and Alabama. With respect to
South Carolina he observes:
"Negroes have encountered stubborn opposition to even
a gradual admission to Democratic primaries in South Caro-
lina. The last vestige of the white primary was stricken
down by court action in that state in 1948. Prior to that
time virtually no Negroes voted in the primaries. About
35,000 are reported to have cast ballots in the 1948 prim-
ary. 8
Thus it is clear that judicial decisions have been a powerful
influence in assisting the Negro to obtain the right of franchise.
The decision of this Court in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373
(1946), has made an important contribution to racial equality in
the field of transportation."9 And evidence was offered in the
instant case showing that where segregation in the University
of Maryland Law School was ended by judicial compulsion the
subsequent experience was wholly satisfactory.70
That the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson greatly over-estimated
the practical difficulties of eliminating segregation through gov-
ernmental action is likewise apparent from the accumulation of
evidence in recent years that discriminatory practices, long rooted
in the "usages, customs and traditions" of the community, can
be successfully eradicated. The President's Committee on Civil
Rights, in one of the most significant findings of its well-docu-
mented report, concludes:
"If reason and history were not enough to substantiate
the argument against segregation, recent experiences further
strengthen it. For these experiences demonstrate that segre-
gation is an obstacle to establishing harmonious relation-
ships among groups. They prove that where the artificial
barriers that divide people and groups from one another are
broken, tension and conflict begin to be replaced by co-
operative effort and an environment in which civil rights can
thrive." 7'
Specifically in the field of education I. E. Taylor, after noting
the increase of Negro teachers in white colleges, observes:
"Reports are coming in that Negro scholars are giving
68. Id. at 522. For a full account of Negro voting and the white
primary litigation, see id. at 517-22, 619-43. See also Murray (Ed.), The
Neqro Handbook 48-53 (1949). It has been estimated that the number of
Negroes registered to vote in the South increased from 211,000 in 1940 to
over 1,000,000 in 1948. Id. at 53.
69. See, e.g., id. at 64.
70. R. 290. This evidence was excluded by the trial court.




a good account of themselves, that their students are enthu-
siastic and open-minded, and that alumni and parents are
taking the situation calmly."7 2
The elimination of segregation in public housing raises issues
perhaps more difficult than those involved in its elimination from
higher education. Yet Charles Abrams, one of the country's fore-
most authorities on housing, writes:
"Where Negroes are integrated with whites into self-
contained communities without segregation, reach daily con-
tact with their co-tenants, are given the same privileges and
share the same responsibilities, initial latent tensions tend
to subside, differences become reconciled, cooperation en-
sues and an environment is created in which interracial
harmony will be effected.
"This conclusion is supported by many reports of hous-
ing authorities who have ventured into mixed occupancy. ' 7 3
Experience with the abandonment of segregation in the armed
services, again closely comparable with the situation in higher
education, has been similar. The report of the President's Com-
mittee on Civil Rights cites an illustration involving Negro and
white soldiers during the war:
"The Negro soldiers were trained and organized into
platoons, which were placed in regiments in eleven white
combat divisions. For months the Negro and white men in
these divisions worked and fought side by side. Then, white
officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men in seven
of the eleven divisions were interviewed. At least two of
these divisions were composed of men who were predomi-
nantly southern in background. It is surprising how little
the response of these southern men varied from that of men
from other parts of the country.
"Two out of every three white men admitted that at first
they had been unfavorable to the idea of serving alongside
colored platoons. Three out of every four said that their
feelings toward the Negro soldiers had changed after serv-
ing with them in combat."7 4
72. Taylor, Negro Teachers in White Colleges, 65 School and Society
369 (1947).
73. Abrams, Race Bias in Housing 22 (1947), pamphlet publishedjointly by American Civil Liberties Union, National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, and American Council on Race Relations.
For other accounts of the successful elimination of segregation in housing
see Ottley, The Good-Neighbor Policy-At Home, Common Ground, Sum-
mer 1942, p. 51; Manning and Phillips, Negroes as Neighbors, 13 Common
Sense 134 (1944) ; Home and Robinson, Adult Educational Programs in
Housing Projects with Negro Tenants, 14 Jour. Negro Educ. 353 (1945);
Abrams, The Segregation Threat in Housing, 7 Commentary 123 (1949);
Report of President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights
85-7 (1947).
74. Id. at 83. With respect to the experience of the Merchant Marine
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Following up the recommendations of his Committee, Presi-
dent Truman in July, 1948, issued an Executive Order stating:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President
that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for
all persons in the armed services without regard to race,
color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put
into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the
time required to effectuate any necessary changes without
impairing efficiency or morale. '75
Experience with governmental efforts to eliminate segregation
in employment points consistently to the same conclusion. The
Fair Employment Practice Committee, established during the war
to promote equality of all races in employment, summarizes its
experience of five years in its final report:
. "Two fundamentally hopeful facts developed out of the
Government's efforts to open war time opportunities to all
workers:
"1. Employees and workers abandoned discrimination in
most cases where Government intervened.
"2. Once the barriers were down, the workers of varying
races and religions worked together efficiently and
learned to accept each other without rancor."7 6
The history of state fair employment statutes shows the same
results. Says a member of the New York State Commission
Against Discrimination:
"Critics of fair-employment laws used to claim that long-
established habits of discrimination could not be changed by
legislation. Their argument has been unmistakably an-
swered today. Nearly four years experience in New York-
and similar experience in New Jersey, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Washington, Oregon, New Mexico and Rhode
Island, all of which have passed anti-discrimination legisla-
tion modeled after the New York law-indicates conclusive-
ly that wise legislation creates a climate of opinion in which
discrimination tends to disappear." 77
the Report states: "Where there was contact with Negroes on an equal
footing in a situation of mutual dependence and common effort prejudice
declined." Id. at 85.
75. Exec. Order 9981, Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948).
76. U. S. Fair Employment Practice Committee, Final Report viii(1946). For discussion of FEPC experience in the South see id. at 33-6.
77. Simon, Causes and Cure of Discrimination, N. Y. Times, May 29,1949, § 6, p. 10 at p. 35. Cf. Ross, Tolerance by Law, 195 Harper's Mag.
458 (1947): "Two years of state FEPC's have done more to end job dis-
crimination than fifty years of private agitation, good-will conferences and
educational campaigning." See also N. Y. State Commission Against Dis-




Where private management has seriously undertaken to elimi-
nate discrimination in employment it has been successful. The
American Management Associati6n reports:
"In the face of many objections to the use of Negro labor,
there are the incontrovertible evidences of companies, large
and small, which are hiring qualified Negroes for operations
requiring varying levels of skill-and doing so with marked
success....
"Many of the plants now making use of colored personnel
have no previous history of Negro employment .... These
plants are scattered all over the country....
"It is evident that, irrespective of a company's past his-
tory or its geographical location, Negro workers can be
introduced into a plant, or their employment extended, pro-
vided management is sincerely desirous of taking this
course."
7 8
Thus our present day experience demonstrates that elimination
of patterns of segregation is not only feasible but is rapidly going
forward under government sponsorship. As the American Civil
Liberties Union has pointed out in its most recent survey of the
status of civil liberties in the United States, "race equality under
law advances steadily."79 And again, "[t]he gathering momen-
tum of the many-sided movements to extend the rights of Negroes
was expressed in numerous court cases, legislation, administrative
rules, and liberalized policies in quasi-public organizations."8' 0 The
assumption of the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson that strict en-
forcement of the Fourteenth Amendment in accordance with its
original purposes could not be made effective by governmental
action has simply not been borne out by the actual developments.
It is in this new atmosphere of progress that this Court should now
reconsider the issues raised by the instant case.
78. American Management Association, The Negro Worker 9-11
(1942). Among many other accounts of successful integration of Negro
and white workers see Commission on Discrimination in Employment,
N. Y. State War Council, Breaking Dozer the Color Line, 32 Management
Review 174 (1943); Newman, An Experiment in Industrial Democracy,
22 Opportunity 52 (1944) ; Gillmor (president of Sperry Gyroscope Co.),
Can the Negro Hold His rob?, National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People Bulletin 3-4 (Sept. 1944); Ross, They Did It In St.
Louis, 4 Commentary 9 (1947). With regard to the successful integration of
Negro and white workers in labor unions see Bellson, Labor Gains On the
Coast, 17 Opportunity 142 (1939); Sweetland, The CIO and Negro
American, 20 Opportunity 292 (1942).
79. American Civil Liberties Union, 29th Ann. Rep., In the Shadow
of Fear 3 (1949).
80. Id. at 29.
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2. Patterns of segregation have not tended to produce har-
monious relations between races, as the Court assumed in
Plessy v. Ferguson, but have increased tensions and be-
come progressively destructive of the democratic process
in the United States.
It was the judgment of the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson that
the institution of segregation was better left alone, that judicial
intervention under the Fourteenth Amendment would accentuate
the difficulties. Clearly implied was the notion that harmonious
relations would gradually evolve by a process of mutual adjust-
ment.
Mr. Justice Harlan, with remarkable insight, understood that
the majority's hope could not be realized:
"The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will
not only stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irri-
tating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but will
encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state
enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes which the
people of the United States had in view when they adopted
the recent amendments of the Constitution .... The desti-
nies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly
linked together, and the interests of both require that the
common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race
hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What can more
certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and
perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than
state enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground that
colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they can-
not be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white
citizens?" (163 U.S. at 560).
Events have proved that Justice Harlan was right and the
majority of the Court wrong.
The effects of segregation upon the group segregated have
recently been summarized:
"Every authority on psychology and sociology is agreed
that the students subjected to discrimination and segrega-
tion are profoundly affected by this experience. . . .Ex-
perience with segregation of Negroes has shown that ad-
justments may take the form of acceptance, avoidance, direct
hostility and aggression, and indirect or deflected hostility.
In seeking self-expression and finding it blocked by the
practices of a society accepting segregation, the child may
express hatred or rage which in turn may result in a distor-
tion of normal social behavior by the creation of the defense
mechanism of secrecy. The effects of a dual school system
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force a sense of limitations upon the child, and destroy in-
centives, produce a sense of inferiority, give rise to mechan-
isms of escape in fantasy, and discourage racial self-appre-
ciation."8'
The consequences of segregation to the group that maintains
the segregation have been described by Myrdal:
"Segregation and discrimination have had material and
moral effects on whites, too. Booker T. Washington's famous
remark, that the white man could not hold the Negro in the
gutter without getting in there himself, has been corrobo-
rated by many white Southern and Northern observers. 8 2
The psychological and sociological data showing the effects of
segregation upon both groups and the serious tensions it creates
in the community at large have been presented to the Court in
the Brief for the United States in Henderson v. United States
(No. 25, October Term, 1949) as well as by petitioner in this
case. 83 There is no need to review these materials here. The point
we wish to emphasize is that a satisfactory adjustment between
the races has not been achieved through governmental inaction
toward segregation. On the contrary, the continued existence of
segregation has perpetuated and strengthened the grave malad-
justments inherent in the system.
Myrdal, one of the most discerning students of the problem,
has pointed this out, noting that what was merely segregation
forty years ago is becoming a caste system today:
"The spiritual effects of segregation are accumulating
with each new generation, continuously estranging the tvo
groups.'4
The process has recently been described by Macver:
"Now let us consider more clearly the manner in which
the conditions that are confirmed or imposed by discrimina-
tion operate to sustain it. The discriminating group starts
with an advantage. It has greater power, socially and politi-
cally, and usually it has a superior economic position. Thus
81. Note, 56 Yale L. J. 1059, 1061-2 (1947), citing numerous scien-
tific authorities in support of the statement.
82. 1 Myrdal, An American Dilemma 643-4 (1944).
83. The material is relevant as showing both that segregation neces-
sarily implies the inferiority of the segregated group and that separate facili-
ties can in fact never be equal. In addition to the two briefs referred to, see
the studies cited in Note, 56 Yale L. J. 1059 (1947) and Note, 49 Col. L.
Rev. 629 (1949). See also Wirth, Segregation, 13 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 643
(1934); American Council on Education, Thits Be Their Destiny (1941);
American Council on Education, Color, Class and Persoadity (1942);
Bowen, Divine White Right (1934) ; Note, 58 Yale L. J. 472 (1949).




it is enabled to discriminate. By discriminating it cuts the
other group off from economic and social opportunities.
The subordination of the lower group gives the upper group
a new consciousness of its superiority. This psychological
reinforcement of discrimination is in turn ratified by the
factual evidences of inferiority that accompany the lack of
opportunity, by the mean and miserable state of those who
live and breed in poverty, who suffer constant frustration,
who have no incentive to improve their lot, and who feel
themselves to be outcasts of society. Thus discrimination
evokes both attitudes and modes of life favorable to its per-
petuation, not only in the upper group, but to a considerable
extent, in the lower group as well. A total upper caste com-
plex, congenial to discrimination, a complex of attitudes, in-
terests, modes of living, and habits of power is developed
and institutionalized, having as its counterpart a lower caste
complex of modes of living, habits of subservience, and cor-
responding attitudes.""5
Thus the problems created by. segregation are not solved by
themselves or by the natural processes of the community upon
which it has fastened its hold. Quite the contrary, segregation
tends to feed upon itself and grow increasingly malignant. It is
truly a cancer in our society, progressively threatening the health
and very life of democracy. The real nature of segregation was
not grasped by the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson.
3. This Court has ultimate responsibility, under the Consti-
tution, to review the factual and policy judgment of the
Texas legislature in this situation.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that it could not recon-
sider th legal merits of segregation as that topic was "outside
the judicial function. The people of Texas, through their consti-
tutional and legislative enactments, have determined that policy,
the factual bases of which are not subjects of judicial review."
This is wrong. Texas cannot turn into a matter of fact or of
local judgment the expressed principle of the federal Constitution
that the rights of citizens of the United States are not dependent
upon race, creed, or color. No subject is more fit for judicial
review, and strict judicial review, than conduct which strikes at
the heart of the democratic process. Mr. Justice Stone, in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 153 (1938), sug-
gests that close scrutiny is necessary in "the review of statutes
directed at particular religious ... or national ... or racial minori-
85. Macver, The More Perfect Union 67-8 (1948).
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ties"; for the "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry." And see West Virginia State
Bd. v. Barnett, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943).
The institution of segregation is designed to maintain the Negro
race in a position of inferiority. It drastically retards his educa-
tional, economic and political development and prevents him from
exercising his rightful powers as a citizen. It creates maladjust-
ments and tensions which sap the vitality of our society. Mfore-
over, left to itself, it operates to strengthen and accentuate the
very evils which need to be combatted. To this extent it is not
subject to correction by the normal methods of the political process.
On the other hand, judicial action to wipe out segregation has
proved entirely practical and effective. In the light of these cir-
cumstances, not known to or recognized by the majority in Plessy
v. Ferguson, the Court should not hesitate to strike down the
practice as plainly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's guaran-
tee of equal protection.
III.
SEGREGATION SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO EDU-
CATION.
1. The precedents do not uphold segregated education.
Plessy v. Ferguson involved segregation on common carriers
and carefully did not endorse segregation generally. It was urged
in argument that if segregation on carriers were valid, states might
require white and colored persons to use different sides of the
street, or paint their house or business signs different colors, on
the ground that one side of the street or one color was as good as
another. Such action, the Court said, would be invalid, holding
that even segregation must be "reasonable." 163 U. S. at 550.
Though this Court has held that segregation of whites and
Negroes in different blocks in a city is unreasonable, Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917), it has never squarely faced the ques-
tion whether segregation in education is unreasonable. If segre-
gation laws are to be permitted in the casual affairs of life, such
as riding on street-cars, but are to be invalidated when applied
to such fundamental matters as establishing a home, the question
becomes whether the undisputed right to equal education falls
within the first category or the second.
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This is not to say that the problem of the validity of segrega-
tion in education has never been referred to in the opinions of
this Court, but rather that it has never been seriously argued or
deliberately considered. In Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S.
45 (1908), the issue was the validity of a Kentucky statute for-
bidding the teaching of Negroes and whites in the same college.
The sole question raised and decided was that such a statute was
not a violation of due process as an interference with the prop-
erty rights of the educational corporation. The question of the
rights of individuals was carefully put aside (id. at 54) and
the equal protection problem was not involved. In Cumming v.
Richmond County Bd., 175 U. S. 528, 543 (1899), the Court in
so many words excluded the legality of segregation in education
from its decision. Yet in Gong Lure v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927),
the Court treated segregation in education as legitimate on the
basis of the Plessy and Cumming cases despite the fact that the
basic problem was not argued in the Gong Lunz case and that it
was neither involved in Plessy nor decided in Cuimming.
The result is that if segregation in education is constitutional,
it became so under a rule of law that came from no place. So
vital a matter should not have rested on dicta without either
argument or consideration. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U. S. 337, 344 (1938), did observe that segregated education
had been "sustained by our decisions." But the cases cited had
not in fact considered the precise point and that matter was not
involved in the Gaines case, which decided only whether a par-
ticular type of separation in education was "equal." Nor does
Sipucl v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U. S. 631, and 333 U. S. 147
(1948), add anything on this point.
2. Under the rule of reason created by the precedents, segre-
gation is unreasonable.
If we accept arguendo the Plessy case, with its distinction be-
tween "reasonable" and "unreasonable" types of segregation, we
must place segregated education in the category of the "unrea-
sonable." Segregated transportation is at least of shorter dura-
tion, and it is fairly easy to determine -, hether the proffered
alternatives in transportation are in fact equal. Segregated educa-
tion has more severe consequences, with devastating psychological
effects. Furthermore, in segregated education it is impossible in
fact to secure or police that equality which Plessy assumes must
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exist. Fifty years of experience teaches that separate education
virtually never is equal. As the President's Committee on Civil
Rights reported:
"With respect to education, as well as to other public
services, the Committee believes that the 'separate but
equal' rule has not been obeyed in practice. There is a
marked difference in quality between the educational op-
portunities offered white children and Negro children in the
separate schools."86
Even beyond this, however, there is compelling reason-a rea-
son which goes to the heart of democratic principles of educa-
tion-for not extending Plessy v. Ferguson to the field of educa-
tion. This may be briefly stated:
(1) A democratic society, like any other, seeks to transmit
its cultural heritage, traditions and aspirations from generation
to generation . 7 While there are many instruments for transmis-
sion of culture-the family, the church, business institutions,
political and social groups and the schools 8 8-- in our society the
school seems to have emerged as the most important."" This was
to be expected from the fact that in a democracy citizens from
every group, no matter what their social or economic status or
their religious or ethnic origins, are expected to participate widely
in the making of important public decisions. The public school,
unlike the family and other narrower institutions, has thus be-
come the logical agency for giving to all people that broad back-
ground of attitudes and skills which should enable them to func-
tion effectively as participants in a democracy.
Indeed, this consideration lay behind the whole movement
for free compulsory public education. Thus Jefferson stated:
"Even under the best forms [of government) those intrusted with
power have, in time and by slow operations, perverted it into
tyranny; and it is believed that the most effectual means of pre-
venting this would be to illuminate, so far as practicable, the
minds of the people at large. . . ."9 Furthermore, Horace Mann
and many others who fought for free public education valued it
as an instrument for eliminating the class structure in educa-
86. Report of President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure
These Rights 63 (1947).
87. Benedict, Transmitting our Denocratic Heritage in the Schools,
48 Am. Jour. Sociol. 722 (1943), reprinted in Lee and Lee, Social Problems
in America 297 (1949).
88. Myers and Williams, Education i a Democracy 164-227 (1942).
89. Merriam, The Making of Citizens, 88-89, 211-2, 273-4 (1931).
90. Quoted in Curti, The Social Ideas of American Educators 3 (1935).
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tion, namely the segregation of the rich from the poor, which bred
undemocratic attitudes and habits of life. By the same token, op-
ponents of free public education were frequently those who believed
in government by the elite and had little faith in the full develop-
ment of democracy.l
(2) Just as the principle of free public education was the
first important step in realizing democratic objectives through our
educational system, so completely non-segregated public educa-
tion is an essential element in reaching that goal. If children have
race superiority taught them as infants, we cannot expect them
lightly to toss it aside in later life. The answer lies not, however,
in simply indoctrinating them with the principle of racial equality.
Modern educational theory, formulated in answer to the need
of our society for self-reliant individuals voluntarily cooperating
with others to meet the everchanging scene in our dynamic civiliza-
tion,02 postulates a more thoroughgoing solution. According to
this theory, education "is a continuous process from the beginning
to the end of life," and it is a "continuous reconstruction of ex-
perience." 3 That is to say, each new thing learned is assimilated
to some previous thing learned, and the new is in part conditioned
by the old. "Education in America must be education for democ-
racy. If education is life and growth, then it must be life within
a social group.... Schools must be democratic communities where-
in children live natural, democratic lives with their companions and
grow into adulthood with good citizenship a part of their experi-
ence."14
(3) This modern educational theory of learning by doing,
clearly implies the necessity of non-segregated educationi. The
principle of equality of opportunity regardless of race or creed,
so much a part of our American tradition, can be fully achieved
only if this element in our cultural heritage is kept alive and
allowed to grow. The school, as has been shown, is the most
important institution through which this heritage can be trans-
91. Id. at 101-200.
92. See Benedict, op. cit. supra note 87; Kallen, The Education of
Free Mien cc. 10, 11, 12, 15 (1949); Kilpatrick (Ed.), The Educational
Frontier c. 2 (1933) ; The President's Commission of Higher Education, 1
Higher Education for American Democracy 5-9, 101-2 (1947) ; 2 id. 3-9;
Brubacher, Modern; Philosophies of Education c. 14 (1939),
93. Frasier and Armentrout, An Introduction to Education 31, 33 (3d
ed. 1933).
94. Id. at 32. See also Brubacher, op. cit. supra note 92 at 330-1;
Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916); Mayo, The Human Problems
of an Industrial Civilikation (1933); Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts
c. 5 (1948).
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mitted. But, as has likewise been made clear, proper teaching of
the principle of equality of opportunity requires more than mere
inculcation of the democratic ideal. What is essential is the op-
portunity, at least in the school, to practice it. This requires that
the school make possible continuous actual experience of har-
monious cooperation between members of various ethnic and reli-
gious groups and thus produce attitudes of tolerance and mutual
sharing that will continue in later lifeY5 In the segregated school,
this desirable environment does not exist. The most important
instrument for teaching democracy to all people is thus rendered
impotent.
Even for those who believe in the policy behind Plessy v. Fer-
guson, that it is impractical to eliminate segregation in all areas of
our culture at once, education has usually been the logical step
for achieving our ideal of true equality. Since segregated educa-
tion cannot be effective education for equality, the principle of
Plessy v. Ferguson should not be extended to the schools.
IV.
EQUAL FACILITIES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION HAVE
NOT IN FACT BEEN OFFERED TO SWEATT AND, INDEED,
SEGREGATED LEGAL EDUCATION CANNOT UNDER ANY
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFORD EQUAL FACILITIES. HENCE
PETITIONER HAS BEEN DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION
EVEN WITHIN THE BROADEST APPLICATION OF PLESSY
V. FERGUSON.
Up to this point we have challenged the legality of segregation
generally, and particularly in education. But it is perhaps un-
necessary to go so far. Petitioner wants to go to the University
of Texas Law School. The courts below have concluded that
the segregated school is "separate but equal" and, therefore, legiti-
mate. We contend that Texas has not in fact created a segre-
gated law school for Negroes which is equal to its white law
school, and indeed that it is impossible for a segregated law school
to afford opportunities in legal education equal to an unsegregated
school.
In making this argument, we are safely within the boundaries
of all precedents, and Plessy v. Ferguson becomes our direct sup-
port. In any interpretation, that case requires equality if segrega-
95. See Kallen, The Education of Free Men 182-4 et passim (1949);
Macver, The More Perfect Union c. 9 (1948) ; Newlon, Education for
Democracy in Our Time 92-103 (1939).
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tion is to be permitted, and we contend that there is not and could
not possibly be equality here.
The precise point that segregated legal education affords equal
education has never been decided by this Court. In the Gaines
case, 305 U. S. 337 (1938), there was no legal education offered
Negroes in Missouri, and the Court, therefore, was required to
hold only, as it did hold, that equal facilities must be furnished
within the borders of the State. In the Sipuel case, 332 U. S. 631
(1948), the majority found that the question whether "separate"
legal education was or could be "equal" was not properly presented
to it. I
In the Sipuel case, further considered sub norn. Fisher v. Hurst,
333 U. S. 147, 152, Mr. Justice Rutledge disagreed with his
brethren on the procedural issue, and thus reached the question
we have here. Mr. Justice Rutledge observed that the equality
required is "equality in fact, not in legal fiction. Obviously no
separate law school could be established elsewhere overnight capa-
ble of giving petitioner a legal education equal to that afforded
by the state's long, established and well-known state university law
school."
Freed of the procedural barrier in the Sipuel case, we reach
Mr. Justice Rutledge's point in this case. We contend that, if
the equality required by the Fourteenth Amendment is "equality
in fact, not legal fiction," then clearly this over-night law school,
suddenly appearing in Austin and quickly moved to Houston,
does not and cannot equal the University of Texas (white). Its
lack of the attributes of equality is shown particularly by the
testimony of former Dean Earl Harrison of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School and Professor Malcolm Sharp of the
University of Chicago Law School.
Petitioner's right to a completely equal legal education is not
met if at some future time some other Negro might be able to get
equal education in Texas. The decisions establish that petitioner's
right is "a personal one." State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 351 (1938). "The equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution does not refer to rights of the
Negro race, the Caucasion race, or any other race, but to the
rights of individuals." Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 716, 198
P. 2d 17, 20 (1948). See also McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe, 235 U. S. 151 (1914).
The application of this familiar principle means that Texas
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must give Sweatt the opportunity for education "in conformity
with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other
group." Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U. S. 631, 633 (1948).
Sweatt cannot possibly obtain the equal education to which he
is entitled in the special institution set up under the pressure of
this case.
This judgment requires us to compare law schools, a very
special kind of educational comparison. Grade schools and high
schools perhaps can be compared on the basis of physical plant,
or teachers' salaries, or types of plumbing, or number of students
in the class, or variety of courses offered ;9 but these mechanical
approaches to legal education tell only a partial story. The neces-
sary inequality of Texas (colored) is accentuated by factors pecu-
liar to legal education and the standards applicable to grade schools
or high schools have little relevance in such comparison. Some
of the inequalities in the instant case are also the product of the
extremely small size of the school which Texas would require
Sweatt to attend.
(1) Faculty size is not the exclusive measure of a law school,
certainly not where the number of teachers is reasonably large.
But the size has great relevance when it is very small. Texas
contemplates a faculty of only four at Texas (colored) but lists
28 faculty members for the current year at Texas (white)." Al-
though fewer faculty members may be able to give fewer students
at the Negro school a greater proportion of time, it will be the
time of a jack-of-all-trades-not a specialist. Nor will the student
have the benefit of the different faculty viewpoints so beneficial
to the law student.
(2) Apart from the faculty size, faculty quality at Texas
(colored) will not be equal. The primary and secondary school
cases cited above compare teachers as so many interchangeable
units of educational machinery. Assuming arguendo the validity of
that approach to grade schools, law teachers are not thus fungible.
96. For a collection of cases decided for and against Negroes in terms
of size of school, value of school property, location of school, length of term,
number of teachers, etc., see 103 A. L. R. 713. For a similar approach by
Texas in this case see R. 78.
97. Association of American Law Schools, Teachers" Directory 29(1949-50). The number was 21 when this record was made (R. 369)." The
Bulletin of the Texas State University for Negroes, School of Law 4
(1949-50) lists six faculty members, including the librarian, at Texas




justice Jackson put it well when he said, "Nothing, not even an
alluring new curriculum, can take the place of a sagacious and
imaginative teacher. He can impart a sense of the movement and
function of law which is needed as part of the study of each field
of law.""
Very small schools lack the inducements of those somewhat
larger to obtain professors of equal distinction. There is little
possibility of encountering a number of interested and interesting
students in so small a school. Hence, the range of educational
experimentation desired by the able teacher is virtually non-exis-
tent. Development of the teacher's professional reputation turns
upon his achievement of recognition as an authority in a special
field. The small library and the elimination of an opportunity
for sufficient specialization keeps the best prospective teachers-
usually-from staying in the smallest schools if they go to them
at allY' The University of Texas has many professors with names
great in legal education. It is beyond belief that Texas (colored)
can at any time in the predictable future acquire the services of
their equals. Certainly it will not be done within a period of time
meaningful to Sweatt.
(3) A minimal faculty results in minimal course offerings at
the colored school. W17ell-staffed Texas (white) offered 75 courses
for the two semesters of the current academic year; Texas
(colored) can offer no such variety. 00
(4) All these inequalities are accentuated by the lack of other
facilities inevitably resulting from the exorbitant cost of attempt-
ing to furnish duplicate opportunities. This is well exemplified
by differences in the library, the heart of the modern law school.
The Austin School has 65,000 volumes of which 30,000 to 35,000
are not duplicates. Texas is obtaining for its colored school 10,000
volumes, the bare minimum permitted by the American Law
School Association. 10' On the basis of pre-war price standards
98. Jackson, Thc Product of Our Present-Day Law Schools, 9 Am.
Law School Rev. 370, 375 (1939).
99. These problems are well discussed by Dean B. F. Boyer, Univer-
sity of Kansas City Law School, The Smaller Law Schools, 9 Am. Law
School Rev. 1469 (1942).
100. University of Texas Law School Catalogue 25 et seq. (Aug. 1,
1948). The Bulletin of the Texas State University for Negroes, spra note
97 at 14-17, lists 39 courses for the two semesters. In making this calcula-
tion we have taken the course headings, as listed in the catalogues, as con-
stituting a "course."
101. The Bulletin of the Texas State University for Negroes, supra
note 97 at 5, states that the library of Texas (colored) now contains 23,000
volumes. The number of duplicates does not appear.
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it would cost the state of Texas something over $100,000 to obtain
a library for the colored school equivalent in size to the non-
duplicate list of the white school.10 2 This is $100,000 which Texas
shows no present intention of spending, and as a practical matter
only a large staff of diligent librarians could find such a collection
of books in any short time. Without such a library, the kind and
quality of research experience given Sweatt will be far inferior
to that given the white citizens of Texas.
(5) Texas (colored) gives its graduates an economic oppor-
tunity inferior to that of the graduates of the University at Austin.
In addition to any economic difficulties Sweatt may meet as a
Negro, he would acquire an unequal professional standing by grad-
uation from a segregated law school. Professional careers are seri-
ously affected by the repute in which the school is held by the
profession at large. Moreover, Texas (colored) is a raw, new in-
stitution not only without prestige but without alumni. Texas thus
deprives Sweatt of placement opportunities given to the graduates
of the old, established school.' 0 3 Assistance of this kind is most
important in the present situation of the Texas bar for, in the words
of the Assistant Dean of Texas (white) : "It is obvious that the
existing firms will not be able to absorb the great number of men
being graduated from the law schools in Texas.' 0 4 The placement
efforts of Texas (white) based, as they must be, upon the loyalty
of alumni and the established reputation of the institution empha-
size the inequality of opportunity Texas would give Sweatt.
(6) Work on a law review is considered a desirable part of
the training of good law students. The University at Austin has
an excellent review on which its students may aspire to serve.
Texas (colored) cannot have a law review for lack of a sufficient
number of topnotch students to man it.
(7) The training of moot court work depends in great meas-
ure on the quality of competition among groups of students. Moot
court activities at Austin are based on such competition. Sub-
stantial numbers are necessary to create satisfactory competitive
groups.
102. The calculation is based on Moylan, Selected List of Books for
the Small Law School Library, 9 Am. Law School Rev. 469 (1939), and
the testimony of Hargraves, librarian of the University of Texas law
school (R. 142).
103. Associate Dean James P. Gifford, Columbia University School of
Law, in an extensive report on placement method observed, "Practically
all schools use their alumni as sources of information about openings." 9
Am. Law School Rev. 1063, 1066 (1941). Dean Gifford also discussed the
value of moot courts, dinners, and speeches as placement aids.
104. 12 Texas Bar Journal 208 (1949).
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(8) Finally, that part of a legal education which results from
doing lawyer's work in a legal aid clinic requires for successful
operation a sufficient number of competent students to manage
and supervise the novices. 05
And yet, if by some miracle Texas could surmount all these
obstacles, it would still not create an equal opportunity for legal
education. If it assembled a staff of the greatest teachers in America;
if it spent a large sum to create an equal library; if it afforded
equal placement opportunities for every graduate; if it overcame
every other difficulty, Texas (colored) would still not be equal.
For the segregated plan misses the whole purpose of a modern
law school.
The lawyer, to meet the responsibilities of his profession, must
have a vital sense of the culture of the community in which he
lives and works. "Lawyers are perpetually engaged in trying to
anticipate, prevent, mediate, settle or win human disagreements
involving alleged rights recognized at law. Their thinking, plan-
ning and action are framed and limited by what they understand
to be the prevailing principles and doctrines of law-what the
judges, or legislatures have decided in like situations before or,
more accurately, what they guess judges or legislatures would
decide in like situations tomorrow."'10 6 The knowledge required
for these tasks can in part be obtained from books; but a major
share must come from intimate knowledge of the ways of thought
of the community. "He (the lawyer) is literally lost unless he
can sense the drives, interests (and weaknesses) of those with
whom he deals--whether as witnesses, negotiators, judges, clients,
or opponents.' 
0 7
Hence it is important that the lawyer receive his training in
the group with which he is to live and to practice. In speaking
of training in legal ethics, which is one part of this training
process, Lloyd Garrison has observed:
"Thus in classrooms, dormitories, clubs, and playing
fields the student gets to know not a handful of neighborhood
acquaintances but a cross-section of his contemporaries,
drawn from innumerable localities and environments and
varying widely in capacities and tastes. He will note them
105. For a description of the work of the Texas (white) legal aid pro-
gram see Patterson, The Legal Aid Clinic, 21 Tex. L. Rev. 423, 426-9 (1943).
The Bulletin of the Texas State University for Negroes, supra note 97 at
7, states that a legal aid clinic has been established at Texas (colored).
106. Rostow, Liberal Education and the Law: Preparing Lawyers for
Their lVork in Our Society, 35 A. B. A. Jour. 626, 628 (1949).
107. Id. at 629.
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all, and in the activities and competition of the communal
life he will perceive the various gradations of excellence
which that life reveals in his fellows, and will desire increas-
ingly t6 resemble those who stand out as the most admirable.
In the same manner he will judge his teachers, and will be
drawn slowly but certainly to those whose qualities of mind
and character shine the most luminously. '1°
The student at Texas (white) will imbibe the lessons not only
of character but of the knowledge of human beings from a far
larger portion of that "cross-section of his contemporaries" than
could any student at a segregated school. In classifying the stu-
dents at the two schools by the test of color, Texas effectively
eliminates much of the cross-fertilization of ideas. When a law
student is forced to study and talk the shop talk of justice and
equity with a segregated handful, he is circumscribed in the effort
to achieve any real understanding of justice or equity. At Texas
(colored) Sweatt will lose the opportunity of exchanging ideas
with a complete variety of fellow students. He will thus lose
part of the opportunity to absorb those received traditions of
justice and fairness on which Texas law, like the rest of the Anglo-
American law, is based.'0 9 The attorney uncultivated in the tradi-
tions of justice and fairness is handicapped in advising clients or
in dealing with attorneys and judges who are a part of the broad
stream of Texas jurisprudence deepened as a result of the years
of group association at the Austin school.
This lack of opportunity for full discussion with a group of
completely divergent views has other and more technical aspects.
Classes themselves must be large enough for presentation and
discussion of divergencies. This does not mean that classes must
be large in an absolute sense, but Texas (colored) cannot meaure
up for two reasons: (a) there must be at least enough students
to make a sample large enough to include a few good ones; and
(b) there must be in the group a divergency of points of view.
The method of legal education depends entirely upon that thrust
and parry of diverse ideas which cannot exist among a handful
of segregated students.
108. Garrison, Address, American Bar Association Section on Legal
Education, Boston, 1936, in 8 Am. Law School Rev. 592, 594 (1936).
109. "The common law grew up as a taught tradition in the Inns of
Court on the basis of the tradition of the courts. It was a taught tradition
handed down from lawyer to apprentice from the seventeenth century and
is now coming to be a taught tradition of academic law school." Pound,
Social Control Through Law 50 (1942). See Rules of the State Bar of
Texas, Art. 3, § 1, 1 Tex. Stat. 696 (Vernon 1947) and Rule 1, Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure (Vernon 1942).
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If Texas denies Sweatt an education which is in fact com-
pletely equal, it also denies him an opportunity to develop the re-
spect for law essential to the lawyer. Texas cannot make its
colored school equal in the eyes of the law without contradicting
plain facts. Were such a legal fiction adopted-were Sweatt com-
pelled to live with such an assumption-he would be living falsely.
Three years of such living must tend to deprive him of those
attributes characteristic of the young lawyer fresh from school,
"the humility and perspective, the courage and disinterestedness,
the devotion to honest craftsmanship and, above all, the deep
feeling that the government should serve all and serve justly."110
To all these elements of inequality there must be added the
considerations developed in earlier sections of this brief, and in
other briefs filed with the Court-that segregated legal education,
in common with every form of segregation, perverts and distorts
the healthy development of human personality in the group sub-
jected to such discrimination.
The inescapable inequality of Texas (colored) lies in the fact
that legal education is not a mere matter of cubic feet of classroom
space, or the possession of a few thousand books, or the presence
of four lawyers recently become teachers. If, instead, legal educa-
tion is t-omething alive and vital, if the measure is not cubic feet
of air space but the intellectual atmosphere within the walls, if law
teachers are appraised as individual men of varying degrees of
talent, if education is in large part association, if research and
practice are part of the job of legal training, if segregation in law
school warps and corrupts the mind and personality of man-if
any of these things is true, then certainly this Texas Negro institu-
tion is a mockery of legal education and of the equal protection
(if the laws.
CONCLUSION.
Every branch of the government, in its own way, has the duty
of meeting a challenge of our times that Democracy is unreal, a
promise without fulfillment. This requires more than words. It
requires that we bring our practices up to our pretensions. The
account by General Bedell Smith of his experiences as Ambassador
to Russia, as reprinted in the New York Times, dealt at some
length with the publication Amerika, which our country distributes
in Russia. In the Times General Smith reprinted two pictures
110, Jackson, The Product of Our Present-Day Law Schools, 9 Am.
Law School Rev. 370, 371 (1939).
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from Anterika as samples of our message to Moscow. One of
those pictures was of an unsegregated school room. Is this really
our message to the world, or must we send a postscript that there
is a special exception for young men studying the Constitution
of the United States in the State of Texas? The Texas legislature
has no authority to answer that question for the rest of America.
The equal protection clause has answered it.
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